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Voluntary co-determination produces sustainable competitive
advantage
Abstract
The importance of firm-specific knowledge for a company's sustainable competitive advantage is well
established in the knowledge-based theory of the firm. However, the impact of corporate governance
design on firm-specific knowledge investments is underexplored. We assess existing co-determination
systems in Europe and their impact on firm performance; then we discuss voluntary co-determination as
a new corporate governance design that fosters firm-specific knowledge investments, intrinsic work
motivation, efficient monitoring, and board diversity while lowering transaction costs. Our analysis
indicates that shareholders can increase their company's value by adopting customized co-determination
rules.	
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VOLUNTARY CO-DETERMINATION PRODUCES SUSTAINABLE 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
Abstract 
The importance of firm-specific knowledge for a company’s sustainable competitive 
advantage is well established in the knowledge-based theory of the firm. However, the impact 
of corporate governance design on firm-specific knowledge investments is underexplored. We 
assess existing co-determination systems in Europe and their impact on firm performance; 
then we discuss voluntary co-determination as a new corporate governance design that fosters 
firm-specific knowledge investments, intrinsic work motivation, efficient monitoring, and 
board diversity while lowering transaction costs. Our analysis indicates that shareholders can 
increase their company’s value by adopting customized co-determination rules. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In many European countries, co-determination laws were introduced in order to foster 
democracy within the economic system. After adopting and strengthening democratic 
mechanisms at the political level, co-determination within companies was the next step. The 
reasons given for co-determination were based on moral or political grounds rather than 
efficiency considerations (Höpner, 2004). 
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Today, co-determination is criticized by some practitioners. There are attempts to restrain or 
even to abolish existing co-determination regulations. Recent developments at the level of the 
European Union (EU) have led to loopholes – companies are able to evade co-determination 
laws e.g. by incorporating in another EU country with less co-determination requirements. In 
2005, every seventh newly founded limited liability company in Germany was incorporated 
under the British legal form (Bundesregierung, 2006). 
While mandatory co-determination regulation has become less important, we suggest 
voluntary introduction of customized co-determination rules as promising for the future. A 
company’s competitive advantage is largely based on firm-specific knowledge created by its 
employees. Investments in firm-specific knowledge can neither be taken for granted nor be 
enforced through contracts. Employees who invest in firm-specific knowledge become 
vulnerable; the value of their knowledge diminishes when they work for a different employer. 
Therefore, employees prefer to acquire general (rather than firm-specific) knowledge unless 
their interests are protected. If employees refuse to make firm-specific investments, the 
company’s competitive advantage will be easier to imitate and hence is less sustainable. 
We suggest three measures to solve this problem: (1) The board should rely more on insiders. 
(2) The insiders should be elected by those employees of the firm who undertake firm-specific 
knowledge investments. (3) The board should be chaired by a neutral person. 
In addition to encouraging firm-specific knowledge investments, our proposals offer further 
advantages: They countervail the dominance of executives, they encourage intrinsic work 
motivation by strengthening distributive and procedural justice, and they ensure diversity on 
the board while lowering transaction costs. Our proposed measures for reforming the board 
may help to overcome the current crisis of corporate governance. At the same time, they 
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provide a step in the direction of a more adequate theory of the firm as a basis for corporate 
governance. 
IS CO-DETERMINATION A PHASE-OUT MODEL? 
During the 20th century, several European countries introduced co-determination regulations. 
In August 2006, Germany celebrated the 30th anniversary of its co-determination law. Apart 
from jubilee speeches, there were many critical comments. The controversial discussion on 
co-determination was mirrored in press reports. “Power Struggle on Co-determination”, “30 
Years of Dispute”, and “No Reason to Celebrate?” were some of the headlines. 
In her speech, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated her opinion that co-determination 
is a “big achievement” (Bundesregierung, 2006). She said: “The German model has an 
exceptional position. It hasn’t been adopted in this manner by any other country.” This 
statement, however, might be misleading. Today, co-determination regulations are a wide-
spread phenomenon in European countries (Kluge & Stollt, 2006). Each country has 
developed its own model of co-determination; none of the models are identical (see Table 1). 
In some areas, there are even more comprehensive forms of co-determination than in 
Germany. Many co-determination laws were legislated as early as the 1970s. 
Among the 25 countries belonging to the European Union (EU) in December 2006, 11 
countries have relatively far-reaching co-determination laws (see Table 1). In 7 other EU 
countries, there are limited co-determination regulations (e.g. restricted to state-owned 
enterprises), and the remaining 7 countries do not have any legislation on co-determination 
(Vitols, 2005; Kluge & Stollt, 2006). 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
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Most of the co-determination laws allow the employees to take up one third of the seats at 
the board of directors. The German model is insofar unique as it provides for parity co-
determination for companies with more than 2000 employees (i.e. 50% of the board seats are 
allocated to employee representatives). However, the parity is attenuated in two respects: One 
employee representative is a representative of middle management. Furthermore, the 
chairperson of the supervisory board is chosen by shareholders. In the case of a stand-off, the 
chairperson can cast a double vote (Vitols, 2005). 
Another important feature of co-determination is the level at which it applies. Co-
determination at the plant level (through works councils) gives employees co-determination 
rights on some topics and rights to information or consultation on other topics. Co-
determination at the board level, however, allows for co-determination on all essential 
decisions regarding the company. In the latter case, employee representatives bear legal 
obligations due to the fact that they are members of the board. The two levels of co-
determination are not independent; in some countries, for example, employee representatives 
at the board level are nominated by the works council (Kluge & Stollt, 2006). 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CO-DETERMINATION AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE 
A number of different performance measures have been used in empirical studies. Most 
performance measures can be clustered to four areas (Vitols, 2005): Labor variables (e.g. 
satisfaction, commitment, and employee turnover), company operations (e.g. productivity and 
innovation), financial performance (e.g. profitability), and stock market performance (e.g. 
share price increase). Furthermore, most empirical studies examine the impact of works 
councils (co-determination at plant level); only a few studies explore the impact of co-
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determination at the board level. The majority of the empirical studies (in both areas) focus 
on German company data. 
Co-determination at Plant Level 
Jirjahn (2005) and Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner (2004) provide a recent overview of 
empirical research on works councils. The main findings are summarized hereafter. Several 
studies show that works councils increase productivity under the condition that the enterprise 
is bound to a collective labor agreement (Jirjahn, 2003; Wagner, 2005; Hübler, 2003). Hübler 
and Jirjahn (2003) suggest that Germany’s system of collective labor agreements makes 
works councils focus more on increasing the company’s surplus, since they are less involved 
in the conflict of the division of that surplus. In companies that are not bound to a collective 
labor agreement, works councils lead to a higher wage level of employees (Jirjahn & Klodt, 
1999). Works councils influence not only wage levels but also wage spreads: Enterprises with 
a works council have a smaller wage differential between qualified and less qualified 
employees (Hübler & Meyer, 2001) and between men and women (Gartner & Stephan, 2004). 
Moreover, works councils are related to a lower rate of personnel turnover (Frick & 
Sadowski, 1995; Addison, Schnabel, & Wagner, 2001; Dilger, 2002) – this effect is amplified 
when the enterprise is bound to a collective labor agreement (Frick & Möller, 2003). On the 
other hand, the combination of a works council and a collective labor agreement is associated 
with a lower willingness to recruit elder employees, since these companies tend to accentuate 
internal labor markets (Heywood, Jirjahn, & Tsertsvadze, 2005). Enterprises with a works 
council run a higher risk of being closed – however, this effect is significantly smaller for 
enterprises that are bound to a collective labor agreement (Addison, Bellmann, & Kölling, 
2002). Works councils are also associated with a higher probability of performance-linked 
payments (Heywood & Jirjahn, 2002). Enterprises with works councils offer more training to 
their employees, especially when new technologies and products are introduced (Hübler, 
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2003). The training’s impact on productivity is increased through the existence of a works 
council (Smith, 1994; Zwick, 2004). With respect to working time models, works councils are 
related to a higher use of working-time accounts (Dilger, 2002; Hübler & Jirjahn, 2003; 
Ellguth & Promberger, 2004) and shift-work (Jirjahn, 2004). This effect may be interpreted as 
an enhanced willingness of the employees to cooperate. The trend toward flexible production 
concepts poses a challenge for works councils: Enterprises with semi-autonomous teams are 
less likely to have works councils (Hübler & Jirjahn, 2003). However, the existence of a 
works council raises the probability of introducing teams (Hübler & Jirjahn, 2002), which 
indicates that enterprises with works councils may be catching up. Introducing teamwork 
combined with the existence of a works council leads to higher enterprise performance 
(Zwick, 2003). Askildsen, Jirjahn, and Smith (2006) find a positive impact of works councils 
on environmental investment and on product innovations. According to Jirjahn and Kraft 
(2005), works councils have a positive effect on incremental product innovations and a 
neutral effect on radical product innovations. 
Overall, the empirical work suggests that co-determination at the plant level has the potential 
to create a number of positive effects if it is embedded in an appropriate general framework. 
Workers appear to be more willing to cooperate (e.g. by working in shifts) when their 
preferences are taken into account; and a lower personnel turnover is a good precondition for 
the acquisition of firm-specific knowledge (Jirjahn, 2005). However, some methodological 
problems need to be acknowledged. Longitudinal analysis is difficult to accomplish since 
very few plants introduce or abandon works councils during the observed period (Addison et 
al., 2004). Furthermore, almost all large-scale enterprises in the samples have works councils, 
which makes it difficult to distinguish specific effects of works councils for these enterprises 
(Höpner, 2004). 
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Co-determination at Board Level 
There has been much less research on co-determination at the board level compared to co-
determination at the plant level. Most empirical studies have focused on co-determination in 
Germany, particularly on the politically imposed introduction of parity co-determination in 
1976. Empirical research on co-determination at board level has shown mixed and partly 
contradictory results, which are summarized by Vitols (2005) and Jirjahn (2005). Svejnar 
(1982), Benelli, Loderer, and Lys (1987), and Baums and Frick (1998) find no significant 
effect of co-determination on firm performance and stock prices. Other studies show a 
negative effect on productivity (FitzRoy & Kraft, 1993) and stock market performance 
(Schmid & Seger, 1998; Gorton & Schmid, 2000). In contrast, recent studies indicate small 
positive effects on innovation (Kraft & Stank, 2004) and productivity (FitzRoy & Kraft, 
2005). Gurdon and Rai (1990) present a positive effect on profits and a negative effect on 
sales. Finally, Gorton and Schmid (2004) analyze the causes of the negative impact on stock 
market performance; they find that parity co-determination negatively affects the relationship 
between shareholder value and management compensation and positively affects the 
relationship between employment and sales – which indicates over-employment and neglect 
of shareholders’ interests. Gorton and Schmid (2004) point out that shareholders react to their 
loss of control by linking supervisory board compensation to firm performance and by 
increasing the firms’ leverage (through borrowed capital). 
Altogether, the results about co-determination in Germany hardly lead to a conclusive overall 
picture. Some of the studies have been criticized for methodological problems, such as simple 
comparisons of mean values, the use of cross-sectional data and short data series (FitzRoy & 
Kraft, 2005). Furthermore, the samples, time periods, and methods of estimation vary 
considerably from one study to another (Jirjahn, 2005). 
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Studies on board co-determination outside Germany are rare, and they tend to use subjective 
evaluations of managers and workers (Vitols, 2005). For example, Levinson (2001) asks 
managers about how they perceive the effects of co-determination. The managers perceive the 
workers’ representation as a resource rather than a burden, which leads to a cooperative 
climate and an easier implementation of difficult decisions. The workers’ representatives play 
a rather peripheral role in board activities unless topics like personnel issues, competence 
development, workplace questions, or reorganizations are concerned. 
Empirical research on board co-determination is inconclusive at the company level. But what 
about observed effects at the national level? Are co-determination and a strong national 
economic performance mutually exclusive? Vitols (2005) divides the EU countries into two 
groups: those with far-reaching co-determination laws (see Table 1) and those with limited or 
no co-determination laws. The group of nations with far-reaching co-determination laws 
shows superior performance with regard to many indicators, e.g. unemployment, labor 
productivity, research spending, and labor peace. The strike rate is more than ten times lower 
in countries with far-reaching co-determination laws. To be sure, co-determination laws are 
not necessarily the cause for superior economic indicators. However, the results show that co-
determination and a sound economic performance are not inconsistent with one another. 
Finally, Höpner (2004) examines the proposition that countries with co-determination laws 
suffer a “co-determination discount” at the stock market. Based on McKinsey’s “Investor 
Opinion Surveys”, Höpner finds no significant correlation between the countries’ share price 
discount and their scope of co-determination. However, there are significant relationships 
between the countries’ share price discount and their systems of corporate control. For 
example, Germany became one of the countries with the lowest share price discount after 
introducing new accounting standards and a better protection of minority shareholders. 
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To summarize, research on co-determination (both at plant level and at board level) has 
provided useful insights as it has shown that co-determination in general is not a phase-out 
model. However, the quantitative studies have been limited by the “dummy variable 
approach”, which differentiates only the presence and the absence of co-determination. Future 
empirical research could examine different intensities of co-determination (Höpner, 2004; 
Zugehör, 2003) or use in-depth case studies (Addison et al., 2004). 
Moreover, empirical co-determination research has two theoretical shortcomings. Firstly, it 
analyzes the impact of co-determination under past and present conditions. It does not take 
into account what today is common understanding in the strategic management literature, 
namely that the key task of modern corporations in the future is to generate, accumulate, 
transfer and protect firm-specific knowledge to create a sustaining competitive advantage (e.g. 
Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984; Grant, 1996; Teece et al., 1997; Kogut & Zander, 1996; 
Spender, 1996; Foss & Foss, 2000). Secondly, so far empirical co-determination research is 
unconnected to modern knowledge-based theories of the firm as a theoretical basis for 
corporate governance (Osterloh & Zeitoun, 2006). In the following section, we therefore 
discuss two existing theories of the firm, which claim to give a theoretical basis for corporate 
governance. On that basis, we develop our own view of why a specific type of voluntary co-
determination is fruitful to promote knowledge-based competitive advantage for firms. 
 
DIFFERENT THEORIES OF THE FIRM AS A BASIS FOR DIFFERENT 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVES 
The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts 
The dominant view of corporate governance is based on new institutional economics. The 
underlying theory of the firm, called the “governance perspective” (Williamson, 1999), is an 
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application of agency and property rights theory. It has been derived from the view of the 
firm as a nexus of contracts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
It starts with a conflict of interest between managers (agents) and shareholders (principals), 
caused by the separation of ownership and control in public corporations (Berle & Means, 
1932). These conflicts as well as conflicts between shareholders and other stakeholders 
(including the employees) can be solved ex ante by contracts. Only shareholders carry a 
residual risk and should therefore have residual ownership and control. 
In order to align the interests between shareholders and managers, firstly, the control of 
management must be transferred to an independent board of directors. Secondly, managers’ 
and directors’ pay should be tied to their performance (e.g. Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Jensen, 
1993). 
The wave of corporate scandals and the explosion of management compensation drew 
attention to flaws in the corporate governance structure according to this view. Even its 
proponents now admit that the explosion of executives’ and directors’ pay has proven to be 
‘pay without performance’ (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004) or ‘managerial and organizational 
heroin’ (Jensen, Murphy & Wruck, 2004: 45).  In order to improve corporate governance, the 
board should become more responsible to their shareholders. Board members should be made 
more attentive to the shareholders’ interests. For instance, board members should stand for 
annual election by the shareholders (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). 
The idea of board independence has been widely accepted but does not seem to contribute 
much to solving the problem. Most importantly, it has not led to pay moderation of CEOs and 
other managers. The stronger dependency of directors on shareholders might even have fueled 
the pay explosion, because in speculative markets it tends to align interests of CEOs to short-
term share price maximization (Bolton, Scheinkman & Xiong, 2006). In addition, a meta-
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analysis of fifty-four studies on board dependence shows no statistical relationship between 
board independence and firm financial performance (Dalton et al., 1998). 
 
The Firm as a Nexus of Firm-Specific Investments 
Blair (1995), Zingales (1998), and Blair and Stout (1999) argue that it is not in the interest of 
the shareholders to be the exclusive owners of residual control. Firms exist because they 
produce what are commonly called quasi-rents (Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1978) or 
synergies (Foss & Iversen, 1997). Quasi-rents represent the difference between what the 
parties inside the firm jointly generate and what each of them can obtain in the market. Quasi-
rents are the outcome of mutually specialized assets of people who make firm-specific 
investments (Rajan & Zingales, 1998). These investments cannot, or only at high cost, be 
protected by contracts ex ante when the parties enter into a relationship. They represent 
transaction-specific investments that cause sunk costs once the contract has been made and 
are subjected to hold up. What matters is that investors’ ex post bargaining position is 
weakened when the quasi-rents are divided (e.g. by discussing their wages after entering the 
contract). Their firm-specific investment is of little or no value outside the firm and decreases 
their outside opportunities during the term of the contract. It is primarily employees who are 
affected by such hold up. It has been shown empirically that employees who are forced to find 
new jobs lose, on average, 15 percent of their wages (Osterman, 1999). If they were employed 
in the firm for more than 21 years, they stand to lose as much as 44 percent of their wages 
(Topel, 1991). As a consequence, employees have no incentive to undertake firm-specific 
investments if their bargaining position is not protected after they enter into the labor contract 
(Freeman & Lazear, 1996). 
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This critique of the view of the firm as a nexus of contracts leads to a view of the firm as a 
nexus of firm-specific investments. These firm-specific investments create room for ex post 
bargaining after the contracts have been finalized. For this reason, corporate governance can 
be defined as a set of constraints shaping the ex post bargaining over the joint output of firm-
specific investments (Zingales, 1998). Blair and Stout (1999, 2001) claim that it is the board 
that has to take over the task of governing the firm-specific investments and mediating 
between possibly conflicting interests of investors in firm-specific assets that cannot be 
contracted ex ante. The board should act as a neutral third party, which is not involved in 
firm-specific investments. It should act as an impartial ‘mediating hierarch’ and therefore 
should consist mainly of outside directors. Voting rights are only given to shareholders, thus 
maintaining shareholders’ supremacy.  
 
The Firm as a Nexus of Knowledge-Specific Investments 
Blair and Stout’s proposal is important but nevertheless neglects to address the crucial 
differences between firm-specific investments in knowledge and physical or financial capital. 
There are fundamental differences between firm-specific investments in knowledge and 
physical goods. 
Firstly, as far as knowledge investments are concerned, it is not only too expensive to contract 
firm-specific investments ex ante before entering a contract, but it is simply impossible. A 
knowledge worker cannot contract his or her future knowledge as such due to the “knowledge 
paradox” highlighted by Arrow (1973: 171): The value of knowledge invested in the potential 
acquirer is not known until after the knowledge is revealed. Once revealed, the potential 
acquirer has no need to pay for it.  
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Secondly, the generation of knowledge cannot be evaluated in the same way as physical 
goods during the contract term. Only insiders or peers can evaluate firm-specific knowledge 
generation and transformation, because outsiders are rarely able to comprehend the processes 
involved, and are thus not able to protect knowledge investors from a deterioration of their 
bargaining position during the interim period when joint knowledge has not yet led to a 
recoverable output.  
Thirdly, the information asymmetry between management and outside directors leads to the 
external board members being dependent on executives for information. Under present 
conditions, a board dominated by outside directors has to rely largely on information provided 
by the top executives. 
These arguments link corporate governance to the “competence perspective” of the theory of 
the firm (Williamson 1999), which today dominates the strategic management literature but 
which so far was not considered in the corporate governance literature. The “competence 
perspective” or the knowledge based theory of the firm suggests that firm-specific knowledge 
investments are crucial for a sustained competitive advantage of the firm. As a consequence, 
corporate governance should involve inside knowledge workers in the decision-making 
process of the firms’ boards. There are two justifications. Firstly, according to the 
“competence perspective”, firm-specific knowledge, in particular of a tacit nature, is the most 
critical resource. Outside board members cannot understand the firm’s tacit knowledge base 
and its strategic relevance (Coff, 1999:126; Barney, 2005:946). Secondly, contractual 
provisions such as regulating exit, the vesting of options, and repayment schemes are in most 
cases no valid alternatives to board representation of knowledge workers. The reason is that 
the underlying conflicts between shareholders and knowledge workers concerning the 
appropriation of the quasi rents appear in full force only at the level of the board where all 
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conflicting parties should be represented. Such conflict resolution is also in the interests of 
the shareholders themselves as it leads to an increase in the value of the firm. 
 
NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DESIGN 
The distinct characteristics of firm-specific knowledge investments justify that knowledge 
workers are represented on the board. All other stakeholders, with the exception of 
shareholders, are better able to form ex ante contracts and therefore need not be represented 
on the board. Knowledge is indeed a special resource unlike any other resources, as 
highlighted by Arrow´s (1973) knowledge paradox. All other resources can in principle be 
contracted, though sometimes at a high cost. This is not the case for knowledge as long as it is 
not encapsulated in a marketable product. Moreover, even in this case the problem of 
attributing the contribution of each worker to the product is unresolved. Thus, the knowledge 
workers and the shareholders should be involved in the residual control as they bear the brunt 
of the non-contractible residual risk. Contrary to what has been proposed by the dominant 
view of shareholders’ supremacy, this leads us to propose the following board arrangements: 
Firstly, the board should rely more on insiders. The percentage of insiders relative to 
outsiders should be determined by the relationship of firm-specific knowledge capital to 
financial capital.  
Secondly, these insiders should be elected by, and responsible to, those employees of the firm 
who make firm-specific knowledge investments. The board should no longer be solely an 
instrument of financial investors, but also an instrument of knowledge investors, and should 
have the task of aligning the interests of these constituents.  
Thirdly, a neutral person should chair the board. His or her main task is to enable the board 
members to engage in a productive discourse to the mutual benefit of all members of the firm. 
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Moreover, he or she has to ensure that the conditions are such that the board members are 
prepared to contribute to the firm’s common good and to refrain from rent seeking.  
 
Insiders on the Board 
Insiders of the firm, especially those who are knowledge workers, have three major 
advantages over outsiders on the board. Firstly, they are better informed about the issues and 
problems concerning the firm’s business (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Hillmann & Dalziel, 
2003), in particular they can better understand the firm’s tacit knowledge base (Coff, 
1999:126). The more firms compete on the basis of innovation, the more this applies. In times 
of high uncertainty and rapid change, it is no longer possible to maintain control through 
targets set by hierarchical control, because targets in these cases have to be reset at regular 
intervals. It follows that control has to be based on a mutually agreed, ongoing revision of 
goals that takes into account new search procedures. 
A second important advantage of having insiders on the board is that it lessens the board’s 
dependence on CEOs for supplying information. Knowledge workers as directors are a well-
informed source of inside information not filtered by the CEOs. These inside directors have 
superior explicit knowledge, as well as tacit knowledge, on the specific issues and problems 
facing the firm.  
Thirdly, it is not in the interests of outside executive directors, who are also CEOs of other 
firms, to seriously challenge the policies, especially the remuneration of executives. It is well 
known that outside CEOs view the board through CEO eyes, i.e. through a lens that does not 
seriously challenge the power of the CEO. For example, a study by O’Reilly et al. (1988) 
found that the pay of the compensation committee members was a better predictor of CEO 
compensation than the actual performance of the firm. Thus, the membership of employees in 
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the compensation committees would have a moderating effect upon the mutual hiking up of 
compensations by the cross-board membership of outside CEOs.  
 
Representation of Knowledge Investors on the Board 
To solve the problem that contracts cannot be formed ex ante and that the insiders may be 
subservient to the very managers whom they are supposed to control, we propose an 
institutional solution: Financial and knowledge investors should be represented on the board. 
The relationship of the two groups ought to be proportional to the relation of investment in 
financial capital and investment in firm-specific knowledge capital. As a consequence, in a 
firm in which firm-specific knowledge investment is very important, the board should contain 
a large percentage of representatives of knowledge investors. If such employees have to leave 
the firm, they do not only lose their relational capital but cannot convincingly show another 
employer what their contribution was worth. Investing in such a way means losing bargaining 
power compared to investment in general marketable knowledge. In contrast, knowledge that 
has the same marketable value irrespective of the firm in which it is used should not be 
represented on the board. Examples are professionals working in consultancies, accounting 
firms, or legal companies, who often have closer relationships to their customers than to their 
firm. When they decide to work for another company, they often take their customers with 
them and have no sunk costs.  
There are several proposals for measuring knowledge capital (e.g. Bontis, 2001; Lev, 2001; 
Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2003; Strassmann, 1999). To get the firm-specific investment of 
employees in knowledge capital, the knowledge capital must be reduced by a factor that, on 
the one hand, captures the average reduction in wages employees of the firm would suffer if 
they had to work in another firm. On the other hand, it should include the average investment 
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the firm has made in the knowledge of its employees. This calculation requires an 
econometric analysis in which average wage rates in the firm are estimated, depending on a 
set of individual characteristics of the employees, as well as a variable that measures the time 
each employee spent in the firm.  
As an alternative to this intricate process, a firm could voluntarily offer its employees a share 
of seats in the board corresponding to the attractiveness it desires to exhibit towards potential 
contributors to firm specific knowledge. Such a procedure has the advantage of being future 
oriented. 
We suggest that each employee has voting rights according to his or her firm-specific 
investment. It ranges from zero to one. The size of this investment is captured by the 
estimated individual reduction in wage an employee would sustain if he or she had to transfer 
to another firm. Employees who sustain no estimated loss from having invested in their firm-
specific knowledge, or who gain an estimated net profit from knowledge investments by the 
firm, should have no vote.  
 
Neutral Chair of the Board 
We envisage a neutral chair whose task it would be to guarantee an open discussion on the 
board so that all aspects can be duly considered. He or she should establish, as good as they 
can, what has been called an ideal speech situation (Habermas, 1987; Steinmann, 1990). In 
particular, he or she has to make sure that the procedural rules are strictly observed and that 
all relevant arguments are heard and considered. The chair should make an effort to secure 
consensus on the board, especially when complicated issues are at stake. Unanimous 
decisions on the board should be required for constitutional issues of the firm (Buchanan & 
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Tullock, 1962; Romme, 2004). The chair should also decide when, and when not, it would 
be useful to have the executives partake in the meetings of the board, thus securing the board 
a further measure of independence. The chair is therefore a specialist in procedures; he or she 
should not have any voting rights in order to remain truly independent. This can be compared 
to the task of a judge in relation to the jury. 
The neutral chair of the board should be elected by the unanimous vote of its members. This 
ensures ex ante neutrality and grants him or her independence vis-à-vis any special faction of 
the board. Therefore, this person should be an outsider to the firm and should not be 
connected to the firm through previous employment or through any other capacity. Thus, we 
reject the common practice of appointing former CEOs as chairpersons of the board. 
 
ADVANTAGES OF OUR PROPOSAL 
Providing Incentives for Knowledge Investors 
It is worth repeating our plan’s greatest strength. Employees have a stronger incentive to 
become knowledge investors, i.e. to invest in firm-specific knowledge capital. This incentive 
is particularly important for highly educated professionals who, under the present corporate 
governance conditions, have little incentive to become more fully engaged with the firm they 
are working for. Investing in firm-specific knowledge reduces their outside options and thus 
their bargaining position inside and outside of the firm. 
These missing incentives stand in sharp contrast to the emphasis on firm-specific knowledge 
as the most important source of sustained competitive advantage in the dominating strategic 
management literature. In contrast, our plan provides these incentives and contributes to 
building up firm-specific knowledge capital and therewith leads to sustainable efficiency rents 
for firms. Our proposal helps us to overcome one important flaw of the “governance 
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perspective”: This theory disregards the individuals’ incentives to generate and transfer 
knowledge (Dosi & Marengo, 2000; Osterloh, Frey & Frost, 2002). It only considers value 
generation and disregards the interaction between value distribution and value generation 
(Asher, Mahoney & Mahoney, 2005). 
 
Countervailing the Dominance of Executives 
Insiders who possess great familiarity with internal processes and with internal tacit 
knowledge are able to monitor the executives more efficiently than outsiders, since they are 
less dependent on the information provided by executives. In addition, their function as 
representatives of the employees strengthens participation and self-governance by the 
corporate community as a part of corporate governance. Anyone breaking the rules is more 
easily identified by colleagues than by superiors and can be informally admonished. This 
assures that others are doing their part in contributing to the firm’s common good and are 
refraining from rent seeking (Osterloh & Frey, 2004). 
 
Strengthening Intrinsic Work Motivation and Loyalty 
Many employees, in particular knowledge workers, are to a considerable extent intrinsically 
motivated. In order be creative, knowledge work needs autonomy (Amabile, 1996), which is 
the most important condition for becoming intrinsically motivated (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Frey, 
1997; Osterloh & Frey, 2004; Osterloh, 2006). But such intrinsic motivation is undermined if 
individuals feel treated unfairly or exploited by conditions in which distributive justice is 
disregarded. At the same time, loyalty to superiors and to the firm as a whole diminishes, 
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which has been shown by the literature on psychological contracts (Rousseau, 1995) and 
Organizational Citizenship Behavior (Organ & Ryan, 1995). 
 
Ensuring Diversity on the Board while Lowering Transaction Costs 
The neutral chair has a second important function on the board. On the one hand, 
representation by shareholders and knowledge workers ensures that a multitude of different 
aspects are represented on the board. Such diversity is important for making wise strategic 
decisions (Grandori, 2005), particularly in diversified and decentralized organizational 
structures (Child & Rodrigues, 2003). On the other hand, diversity of interests and control 
rights also raises the transaction costs of the decision-making process on the board 
(Hansmann, 1996), a disadvantage that needs to be counterbalanced by the advantages of 
having diversity. The neutral chairperson, as a specialist in procedures or a ‘facilitator’ 
(Grandori, 2001), is able to find generally acceptable solutions to conflicting issues. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mandatory co-determination regulations (both at plant level and at board level) have been 
established across Europe. Despite heavy criticism against co-determination laws, empirical 
research produces an uneven overall picture: Some studies show negative effects of co-
determination; however, there are many studies that exhibit neutral or positive effects of co-
determination on various measures of performance. We suggest that co-determination laws 
might force a too rigid framework upon companies. They do not make sure that enough 
knowledge investors are represented on the board and thus have an incentive to invest in firm-
specific instead of general knowledge. 
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In contrast, voluntary co-determination rules have a promising future. We argue that it is in 
the enlightened self-interest of shareholders to introduce customized co-determination rules. 
Our approach takes into account that a modern corporation’s key task is to generate, 
accumulate and transfer firm-specific knowledge. Firm-specific knowledge investments are 
the essential basis for a sustainable competitive advantage. Financial and knowledge 
investments must be combined to produce what are commonly called synergies or quasi rents. 
As a consequence, these quasi rents need to be divided in a way perceived to be fair by the 
participants. In particular, knowledge investors should not feel exploited; otherwise they will 
refuse to make firm-specific investments and will prefer to make investments in outside 
options. Corporate governance must secure their ex post bargaining position, once the 
(necessarily incomplete) labor contracts have been fixed. It is the board that has to take over 
this task. 
With this end in mind, this paper advances three specific proposals: 
Firstly, the board should rely more on insiders. The percentage of insiders relative to 
outsiders should be determined by the relationship of firm-specific knowledge capital to 
financial capital. 
Secondly, these insiders should be elected by, and responsible to, those employees of the firm 
who make firm-specific knowledge investments. 
Thirdly, a neutral person should chair the board. His or her main task is to enable the board 
members to engage in a productive discourse to the mutual benefit of all members of the firm. 
The chairperson also has to make sure that the board members are prepared to contribute to 
the firm’s common good and refrain from rent seeking. 
Our proposals have major advantages over the reforms suggested by the dominant corporate 
governance approach. With respect to corporate governance design, our proposals provide 
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incentives for knowledge investors; they countervail the dominance of executives; they 
strengthen intrinsic work motivation and loyalty to the firm through distributive as well as 
procedural justice; and they ensure diversity on the board while lowering transaction costs. 
With respect to corporate governance theory, our approach links corporate governance to the 
theory of the firm. On the one hand, we consider the “competence perspective” or knowledge-
based theory of the firm focusing on value generation and on the production of a sustained 
competitive advantage. On the other hand, we take account of the “governance perspective” 
of the theory of the firm, based on new institutional economics, which focuses on the 
distribution of values. Thus, our approach overcomes the separation of theories focusing on 
value generation or value distribution by showing how value generation and value distribution 
interact. 
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TABLE 1 
European Countries with Far-reaching Co-determination Laws1 
Country Criteria for Board-level Representation Workers’ Representation Selection of Workers’ Representatives 
Joint-stock companies 
Austria 
Limited liability companies 
with more than 300 employees 
33% of the supervisory 
board 
Workers’ representatives are appointed by the works council and 
have to be members of the works council. 
Czech Republic Joint-stock companies with more than 50 employees 
33% of the supervisory 
board 
Employees and external trade union officials are elected by 
employees as workers’ representatives. 
Denmark > 35 employees 33% of the board of directors (at least 2 members) Only employees can be elected as workers’ representatives. 
Finland > 150 employees 
Agreement between 
employer and personnel 
groups 
If no agreement has been reached between the personnel groups, 
workers’ representatives are elected by employees. 
500 – 2000 employees 33% of the supervisory 
board 
Germany 
> 2000 employees 
50% of the supervisory 
board 
Only employees can be elected as workers’ representatives. Trade 
unions nominate candidates for the trade union seats. There is a 
special regulation for the iron, coal and steel industry. 
                                                 
1 The information in Table 1 is based on Kluge and Stollt (2006). Table 1 presents the most relevant regulations for companies. However, the co-
determination laws regulate some exceptions and separate rules (e.g. for state-owned enterprises). 
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Hungary 
Joint-stock companies and 
limited liability companies 
with more than 200 employees 
33% of the supervisory 
board 
Workers’ representatives are appointed by the works council and 
have to be employees of the same company. 
Luxemburg > 1000 employees 33% of the board of directors Workers’ representatives are appointed by the works council and have to be employees of the same company. 
Netherlands 
> 100 employees 
Equity capital > 16 Mio. € 
Existence of a works council 
(up to) 33% of the 
supervisory board 
All members of the board have to be independent. Workers’ 
representatives cannot be employees of the same company; they 
are nominated by the works council and appointed by the general 
meeting of shareholders. 
Slovak Republic Joint-stock companies with more than 50 employees 
33% of the supervisory 
board Only employees can be elected as workers’ representatives. 
Slovenia Joint-stock companies with a supervisory board 
33 – 50% of the supervisory 
board (defined in the 
companies’ statutes) 
Workers’ representatives are appointed by the works council. In 
companies with more than 500 employees, there is an additional 
representative on the management board; this representative is 
proposed by the works council and appointed by shareholders. 
25 – 1000 employees 2 members of the board of directors 
Sweden 
> 1000 employees 3 members of the board of directors 
Workers’ representatives are appointed by trade unions that have 
concluded a collective labor agreement. 
 
